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Case Comment
Civil Procedure: Self-Evaluative Reports-
A Qualified Privilege in Discovery?
It has become fairly common for large public institutions
and business entities to initiate self-evaluative investigations
into various aspects of their operations, including the occurrence
of accidents and the degree of compliance with applicable regu-
latory laws. Recently, a few federal courts have held that a
"qualified privilege" will apply to protect the results of such
internal investigations from discovery. This is a somewhat sur-
prising development in a period otherwise marked by a drastic
narrowing of testimonial privileges and an increase in the avail-
ability of discovery.1
The two most recent decisions have relied on a social policy
of encouraging candid self-evaluation to restrict discovery of re-
ports resulting from such investigations. In the first decision,
a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act,2 the widow of a men-
tal patient who had committed suicide at a Veteran's Adminis-
tration hospital charged that her husband's death had resulted
from the hospital's negligence. Defendant asserted a claim of
privilege in objecting to the production of 1) the reports of a
board established by the hospital director to inquire into the in-
cident, 2) the report of the director made after receiving the
board's report, and 3) statements obtained by the board from
hospital personnel. 3 The district court held the reports of the
board and director, and statements by hospital personnel per-
taining to future hospital procedures, were privileged from
discovery because of the public interest in facilitating such
evaluations by maintaining the confidentiality of the investiga-
tion.4 However, production was ordered of those parts of the
1. See note 33 infra.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1970).
3. Plaintiff requested production pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 34,
which provides in relevant part:
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request(1) to produce and permit the party making the request... to
inspect and copy, any designated documents ....
4. Plaintiff had moved for production under Fw. R. Crv. P. 37(a),
which provides:
If... a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted
under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be per-
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statements made by hospital personnel which merely described
the incident. Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
The second case raised the same issue in the context of a
Title VII 5 employment discrimination suit brought against a
government contractor. The defendant company had appointed
a team of employees to study its employment practices, as re-
quired by law of all government contractors.0 Plaintiffs re-
quested production of all reports and written materials prepared
by the team. Defendant agreed to produce a copy of a formal
report prepared for submission to the government,7 but objected
to the production of the team's actual report, a much more com-
prehensive document which included candid self-analysis and
evaluation. The defendant argued that discovery would dis-
courage employers from engaging in extensive self-criticism of
their compliance with equal employment opportunity laws. The
district court, after stating that the report might be considered
nondiscoverable work product, 8 held that allowing discovery
would be contrary to the public policy of encouraging frank
self-criticism of employment practices. However, disclosure was
ordered of the facts available to the team at the time the report
was prepared. Banks v. Lockheed, 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and the Qualified Privilege
The scope of discovery in the federal courts is governed by
mitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as requested,
the discovering party may move for an order compelling ...
inspection in accordance with the request.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
6. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (1972), adopted pursuant to Executive Or-
der 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Comp. 1964-65), provides:
(a) Requirements of programs. Each agency or applicant shall
require each prime contractor who has 50 or more employees
and a contract of $50,000 or more and each prime contractor and
subcontractor shall require each subcontractor who has 50 or
more employees and a subcontract of $50,000 or more to develop
a written affirmative action compliance program for each of its
establishments. A necessary prerequisite to the development of
a satisfactory affirmative action program is the identification
and analysis of problem areas inherent in minority employment
and an evaluation of the opportunities for utilization of minority
group personnel ....
Affirmative action program requirements are described in 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-2.10 to 2.24 (1972).
7. The defendant was required to submit a report on Standard
Form 100 regarding his compliance with Executive Order 11246 to the
Department of Defense Contracts Compliance Office. 41 C.F.R. § 60-
1.7(a) (1972). Standard Form 100 is not a lengthy or complex form, and
in itself would provide the plaintiff with limited information.
8. See note 30 infra.
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Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits
discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action." Under Rule
26(c) the trial court has the power to limit or prevent discovery
to protect a person from embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense.9 Parties opposing discovery of self-evalua-
live reports have presented three arguments under Rule 26:10
1) the material sought is not relevant; 2) production would be
9. FED. R. CIv. P. 26 (b) (1); FED. R. Crv. P. 26 (c).
10. Initially, the argument might be made that self-evaluative re-
ports are conclusions rather than facts and are thus not discoverable.
Prior to the 1970 amendments to the discovery rules, the weight of
authority opposed the discovery of non-factual matter. 4 J. MooRs,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 126.56[3] (2d ed. 1972). However, Professor Moore
has suggested that the "question should be not whether as a theoretical
matter the inquiry calls for an expression of opinion, but rather whether
it is practicable and feasible to answer the inquiry and, if so, whether
the answer might expedite the litigation . . .", and this approach has
been adopted by an increasing number of courts. 4 J. MooRE, supra at
164, and cases cited therein. This view is reinforced by a comparison
with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3), which provides special protection for the
'mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an at-
torney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation"
when discovery is ordered of trial preparation materials. Several
courts have held that mental impressions, etc. are protected from dis-
covery only if they are included in a document otherwise within the
scope of Rule 26(b) (3). Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna
Plovidba, 15 FED. R n.Es SEtv. 2d 26b.71, at 1343 (N.D. IlL 1972); Abel
Investment Co. v. U.S., 53 F.R.D. 485 (D. Neb. 1971); Peterson v U.S.,
52 F.RMD. 317 (S.D. IIl. 1971); Merrin Jewelry Co. v. St Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 49 F.R.D. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see Clower v.
Walters, 51 F.R.D. 288 (S.D. Ala. 1970); Crocker v. U.S., 51 F.R.D. 155
(N.D. Miss. 1970).
A specific provision regarding discovery of non-factual matter by
interrogatory was added to FED. R. Crv. P. 33 in 1970:
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objection-
able merely because an answer to the interrogatory involves an
opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of
law to fact, but the court may order that such an interrogatory
need not be answered until designated discovery has been com-
pleted or until a pretrial conference or other later time.
The Advisory Committee's Note responds to the objection that such in-
terrogatories might reintroduce undesirable aspects of earlier pleading
practice, "'whereby parties were chained to misconceived notions or
theories, and decision on the merits was frustrated," by stating that
ordinarily the interrogating party will not be entitled to rely on the
unchanging character of the answer he receives, and cannot base preju-
dice on such reliance. Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Civ. P.
33, 48 F.R.D. 524.
The amendment to Rule 33 should not be read to restrict inquiry
into opinions, conclusions or contentions by means of depositions or
the production of documents, since the Rule does not speak to these
problems and it would be unreasonable to create a technical require-
ment that such inquiry be made by interrogatory. 4 J. MooRns supra,
26.56 [3].
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unduly burdensome or oppressive; and 3) the material is subject
to a qualified privilege. 1
For the purposes of discovery, relevancy is not only defined
very broadly, but discovery of materials whose relevancy is
borderline is often allowed where compliance with the request
will impose no substantial burden on the opposing party. 12 In
addition, materials sought during the discovery process need
not be admissible at trial if they appear reasonably calculated
to lead to admissible evidence. 13 In spite of this liberal stand-
ard, lack of relevancy has occasionally been raised to prevent
discovery. For example, it has been successfully argued that
disclosure of self-remedial information would contravene the
public interest in encouraging accident prevention measures.'4
Disclosure is also said to create an "undue burden" upon
ameliorative self-investigation. Protection from such burdens is
provided by Rule 26 (c), which functions as an exception to the
general policy of broad discovery; it permits a court to "make
any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden. . . including
(1) that discovery not be had."' 5 The powers conferred by
11. Prior to the 1970 amendments to the discovery rules, Rule 34
required a showing of "good cause" for the production of documents
and tangible things. Many courts then found a lack of good cause where
disclosure would violate public policy, rather than, or in addition to,
relying on "privilege", lack of relevancy, or the protective provisions
then embodied in Rule 30(b). While in most cases only a minimal
showing was required to constitute good cause for production, the
standard was much more demanding where disclosure might conflict
with the public interest. Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th
Cir. 1968); Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970)
(alternative holding). Cf. United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S.
677 (1958).
12. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 81 (2d ed. 1970).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1).
14. In Richards v. Maine Cent. Rd., 21 F.R.D. 590 (D. Me. 1957),
the court noted that the public interest in employee discipline is so
great that a court should not "impose . . . hazards which will render
unlikely the resort to such discipline." It held interrogatories regard-
ing disciplinary action taken against an employee involved in an acci-
dent irrelevant and violative of public policy. Id. at 592.
15. FED. R. Crv. P. 26 (c). Although Rule 26 (c) requires that protec-
tive orders be made on motion and for good cause shown, when
protection is sought in connection with interrogatories or the produc-
tion of documents the rules provide for filing of objections instead of
answers. Professor Moore suggests that since the 1970 amendments
were designed to reduce the necessity of judicial intervention, the need
for protective orders should be considered at the hearing on the motion
to compel production or answers, and the party from whom disclosure
is sought need not move under 26(c). 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
126.68 at 492 (2d ed. 1972).
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Rule 26(c) were designed to handle "the many situations, not
capable of governance by precise rule, in which the court must
exercise judgment."'16 For example, a court must be given wide
latitude to determine whether a protective order should be is-
sued in an antitrust suit where, in response to an interrogatory,
a company complains that it would be an "undue burden" to
reconstruct production figures for a number of past years.
This type of situation brings into focus both the need for
providing a court with wide latitude and the precise scope of
Rule 26(c). The court must be free to consider in each particular
case whether there will, in fact, be an undue burden if an an-
swer is required. The resolution of that question requires that
the scope of Rule 26(c) be determined. The express language
clearly permits protection of a "party or person." If the Rule is
limited to the express language, a court will have less latitude
to decide whether there is an undue burden than if the Rule is
held to encompass protection of general societal interests.
Support for the latter position is provided by Ballard v.
Terrak,17 a civil rights action against a policeman. The police
department had already conducted its own investigation of the
officer's conduct and had completed a written report.' s None-
theless, the police chief was granted a Rule 26(c) protective or-
der. It seems clear that the court did not base its decision on
any real or potential burden to the police department itself,
since the report sought was already prepared. Rather, with a
view toward general societal concerns, the court relied on the
rationale that discovery might impair the internal reporting
process essential to an efficient police force.19
16. Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), 48 F.R.D.
487, 505.
17. 16 FED. RuNEs SERV. 2d 26c.21, at 301 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
18. Id. The court held that although plaintiff was entitled to
those records maintained by the police department in the ordinary
course of its operation, records concerning an internal investigation
were immune from discovery.
19. This reasoning was rejected in Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7(E.D. Wis. 1972), a factually similar case in which the court allowed
the plaintiff to discover an internal investigation file which had been
found in an in camera inspection to consist solely of factual informa-
tion rather than policy discussion. Before reaching this result, however,
the court discussed public policy and explicitly noted that it had the
power to suppress discovery in such a case under Rule 26(c). See also
Carter v. Carlson, 16 FED. RULEs SERv. 2d 26b.43, at 709 (D.D.C. 1972),
which involved a District of Columbia police internal investigation file,
including the evaluations and conclusions regarding the investigating
officer and his superior. Discovery was ordered against a claim of
executive privilege.
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Finally, self-evaluative reports have been protected in some
cases, independent of Rule 26(c), by the assertion of a "qualified
privilege" based on a public policy of fostering frank self-evalu-
ations. In addition to the absolute privileges traditionally rec-
ognized at trial, which are inviolate except on waiver by the
possessor, there have arisen a small number of "qualified privi-
leges" which may be overcome by a showing of sufficient hard-
ship by the party seeking disclosure or admission. 20  For exam-
20. The three most commonly recognized qualified privileges are
for grand jury transcripts and testimony, trade secrets, and for execu-
tive or official government information.
1) Grand jury transcripts. Defendants have generally been denied
access to grand jury transcripts except when the reasons for secrecy
have been minimized by the passage of time and the termination of
criminal proceedings, or when the government has obtained evidence
for use in civil actions by its misuse of the grand jury process, thereby
making it unfair to deny the defendants access. United States v. Procter
& Gamble, 356 U.S. 677 (1958); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628
(3d Cir. 1954); 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.6116.-3] (2d ed. 1972).
Protection was most frequently provided by reliance on the "good cause"
requirement for the production of documents under former Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 34. See note 11 supra. This approach was
taken in United States v. Procter & Gamble, supra at 684, in which Jus-
tice Douglas, speaking for the majority, held that good cause for the pro-
duction of a grand jury transcript had not been shown:
It is only when the criminal procedure is subverted that a
finding of "good cause" for wholesale discovery and production
of a grand jury transcript would be warranted.
There have been few cases involving requests for grand jury trans-
cripts since the "good cause" requirement for the production of docu-
ments was eliminated. However, in Sol S. Turnoff Drug Distrib., Inc.
v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 16 FED.
RULES SERV. 2d 32a.22, at 113 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the court, citing United
States v. Procter & Gamble, required a particularized showing of need
for discovery of information obtained from grand jury witnesses and
summaries of grand jury proceedings (the court also relied in the al-
ternative on the work product protection).
It seems unlikely that wholesale discovery of grand jury proceed-
ings will be precipitated by the amendment to Rule 34. Some control
is likely to be maintained either through Rule 26(c) protective orders
or by reliance on a public policy argument based on the traditional
secrecy of grand jury proceedings. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), which
provides in part that disclosure of matters occurring before a grand
jury may be made "only when so directed by the court preliminary to
or in connection with a judicial proceeding" and implies that the court
has a certain amount of discretion regarding disclosure.
2) Trade Secrets. Trade secrets have been protected at discovery by
virtue of a provision in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (c), formerly
Rule 30(b), which states that the court may order "(7) that a trade se-
cret or other confidential research, development, or commercial in-
formation not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way."
Prior to the 1970 amendments to the discovery rules, some courts also
protected trade secrets by holding that insufficient good cause for the
[Vol. 57:807
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ple, a vaguely defined executive or official information privi-
lege2 1 is often used to protect certain confidential government
documents, including portions of internal agency memoranda
and reports of government investigations.2 2 The rationale un-
production of documents was shown. This policy will be continued in
Federal Rule of Evidence 508, which provides:
A person has a privilege... to refuse to disclose and to prevent
other persons from disclosing a trade secret owned by him, if
the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or
otherwise work injustice.
See 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL, PRACTIcE 26.60[4] (2d ed. 1972); 8 J. WIGMoRE,
EviDENcE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAW § 2212(3) (McNaughton rev. 1961);
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. of Evid. 508, 56 F.R.D. 250, and
cases cited therein.
3) Executive privilege. See text accompanying note 21 infra. This
privilege has traditionally been recognized in the federal courts, al-
though its dimensions have never been clear. Some courts formerly
based the privilege on the Federal Housekeeping Statute, former 5 U.S.C.
§ 22 (Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547), which was used by
administrative agencies to justify departmental regulations limiting
disclosure of information. However, in 1958 the statute was amended
by the addition of a sentence providing that the section does not au-
thorize withholding information from the public. The purpose of the
amendment was to make clear that the statute was not intended to
grant any privilege to government officials to withhold information
from the public. In 1966, Congress enacted the Public Information Act(now 5 U.S.C. § 552), which made the files of departments and agencies
available to the public with certain specified exceptions. The excep-
tions included:
(b) (5)inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency.
(b) (7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses except to the extent available by law to a party other than
an agency.
These exceptions, through the reference "by law," incorporate the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and thus make no change in the existing
law of executive privilege. The exceptions to free availability are
broader than the privilege available under Federal Rules of Evidence
because the Act deals with public information-that which will be
supplied to any member of the public regardless of need. 4 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.61[4.-2] (2d ed. 1972). Nevertheless, some courts
have interpreted the Act to provide a privilege to the government in
the areas covered by the exceptions. See, e.g., Distillery, Rectifying,
Wine & Allied Workers Int'l Union of America, AFL-CIO v. Miller,
16 FED. RULEs SEnv. 2d 26c.31, at 299 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
21. This privilege should be distinguished from the absolute privi-
lege for military and state secrets. See note 20 supra.
22. See note 20 supra. Mackin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.
1963); Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1961); Simon-
Eastern Co. v. United States, 55 F.PD. 88 (N.D. Ga. 1972); FTC v.
Brammen, 54 F.R.D. 364 (W.D. Mo. 1972); U.S. v. Beatrice Foods Co.,
15 FED. RULEs SERv. 2d 26b.41, at 597 (D. Minn. 1971); Black v. Sheraton
Corp. of America, 50 F.R.D. 130 (D.D.C. 1970); Olsen v. Camp, 328 F.
Supp. 728 (ED. Mich. 1969); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss,
1973]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
derlying this qualified privilege is that confidentiality is re-
quired to preserve administrative integrity and encourage coop-
eration in government investigations. 23 Trial courts frequently
balance the public interest in non-disclosure against the liti-
gant's need for the materials in order to determine whether the
executive privilege should be overcome in a particular case.
The "qualified privilege" for confidential self-evaluations,
which resembles the executive privilege and supports a similar
policy of preserving the free flow of communication vital to an
important public interest, was first recognized in Bredice v.
Doctors Hospital.24 In that case, plaintiff sued the defendant
hospital for malpractice and moved for production of the min-
utes and reports of a staff meeting called to review the death of
plaintiff's decedent. The district court held that the documents
were subject to a qualified privilege based on the public interest
in furthering candid evaluation of patient care.25 The court also
indicated that the plaintiff had not shown "good cause" for pro-
duction, as was required under Rule 34 prior to the 1970 amend-
ments.
2 6
40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 38 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
23. Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Farrell v.
Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 385 (W.D.N.C. 1970); Cooney v. Sun
Shipbldg. & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968); McFadden v.
Avco Corp., 278 F. Supp. 57 (M.D. Ala. 1967). Similarly, statements
given to government investigators on the strength of a promise that
the information would only be used in an accident prevention program
are generally not ordered disclosed. See, e.g., Machin v. Zuckert, supra.
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize government privilege only
for secrets of state and the identity of informers, eliminating the qual-
ified executive privilege entirely. FED. R. EvD. 509. The failure to
provide for a broader executive privilege does not necessarily mean
that all internal government documents will automatically be discover-
able. The Advisory Committee Note explains that other existing limi-
tations on compulsory disclosure, such as relevancy, attorney-client
privilege, and discovery restrictions, particlarly in criminal cases,
were thought to afford sufficient protection to these documents. Ad-
visory Committee's Note, Fed. R. of Evid. 509, 56 F.R.D. 252-54.
24. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970). Compare Pennsylvania v. Au-
tomobile Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 336 (D. Ore. 1939), an unusual case in
which the court denied discovery of a list of defendant's witnesses on
the "public policy" grounds that disclosure might have allowed the
plaintiff to devise an alibi to a related criminal charge, even though
disclosure was authorized by former Rule 33.
25. Additionally, the court noted that the hospital was required to
hold committee review proceedings to maintain its accreditation. Bre-
dice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250-51 (D.D.C. 1970).
26. See note 11 supra.
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2. The Gilman and Banks Cases
The courts in Gillman and Banks relied on Bredice in refus-
ing to allow discovery of the opinions and conclusions in confi-
dential documents prepared in the process of self-evaluation.
The fact that these two cases were decided subsequent to the
1970 amendments, which eliminated the "good cause" require-
ment for the production of documents, highlights the indepen-
dent significance of the "qualified privilege" rationale in Bre-
dice.
The fact situation in Giliman roughly paralleled that in
Bredice. However, the Giliman court not only denied discovery
of the reports of the special investigatory board and the hospital
director but also extended protection to suggestions or com-
ments on future procedures made by hospital personnel in
statements to the board.27 Banks applied the Bredice holding
28
in the entirely new context of self-evaluations concerning com-
pliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 indicating
that the newly developed protection would not be limited to situ-
ations involving accidents and medical care. The court found that
allowing discovery of the requested report would discourage com-
panies from engaging in candid self-criticism and evaluation
and would, therefore, be contrary to the public policy favoring
compliance with the civil rights laws. 30 Together, then, Gillman
27. After noting that statements taken shortly after an event are
unique and that these particular statements were important to the plain-
tiffs ability to discover the facts, the Gillman court allowed discovery
of the portions of the statements of the hospital personnel which de-
scribed "what actually happened." It is possible the court would
have denied discovery of even these factual portions of the statements
had the plaintiff's need not been so great.
28. Although the Banks court never used the word "privilege" in
its opinion and the Gilman court spoke of a "qualified privilege" only
in describing the Bredice holding, both opinions relied so heavily on
Bredice that it may be inferred that the courts viewed the protection pis
a privilege.
29. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (1964).
30. Before reaching this point, the court discussed a highly ques-
tionable work product issue, stating that the investigation by the team
"could have been made in preparation for trial" and "the report could
be said to include the 'mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or le-
gal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concern-
ing the litigation.'" 53 F.R.D. at 284-85.
The work product qualification to the ordinarily broad scope of
discovery, developed in the landmark case of Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1957), was partially codified in 1970 in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26 (b) (3):
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things... prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by
19731
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and Banks indicate that some federal courts are willing to exer-
cise rather wide discretion in refusing to compel discovery, at
least where 1) confidential materials are of a self-investigative
and self-evaluative nature and 2) confidentiality is essential to
the evaluative and investigative process. 31  It is important to
or for another party or by or for that other party's representa-
tive ... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his
case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
In ordering discovery ... when the required showing has been
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attor-
ney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
It has frequently been held that materials prepared in the ordinary
course of business or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to liti-
gation are not protected by Rule 26(c) (3). Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle,
Inc., 320 F.2d 45, on later appeal 336 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1963); Thomas
Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 15 FED. RuLEs. SERv. 2d
26b.71, at 1343 (N.D. Ill. 1972); United States v. Maryland Shipbldg. and
Drydock Co., 51 F.R.D. 159 (D. Md. 1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3),
Advisory Committee's Note. Since the defendant in Banks was required
to evaluate its compliance with the order's affirmative action require-
ments and submit a report on its progress to the Department of Defense
Contracts Compliance Office, preparation for trial was at most an an-
cillary purpose of the team's investigation. See notes 6-7 supra.
The court in Banks relied on the dates of initiation of the suits and
the fact that an attorney was placed on the research team to infer that
the documents "could have been made in preparation for trial." Cf.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 52 F.R.D.
367 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (dates of inter-office memoranda and correspon-
dence led court to believe documents were prepared in anticipation of
litigation). But see Peterson v. United States, 52 F.R.D. 317 (S.D.
Ill. 1971) (government required to affirmatively show that documents
were trial preparation materials); Technograph, Inc. v. Texas Instru-
ments, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The danger in requiring only
this minimal showing for work product protection is immediately evi-
dent: by staffing research teams with attorneys, whole departments
might be insulated from normal discovery procedures. See generally
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del.
1954). Litigation possibilities surround virtually every action taken by
a large company and, unless preparation for trial is not inferred but is
required to be specifically shown, abuse is likely. Peterson v. United
States, 52 F.R.D. 317 (S.D. Ill. 1971); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp.
of America, supra.
Since the policy reasons for the work product doctrine-the en-
couragement of written preparation and adequate investigation, the pro-
tection of the privacy of the attorney in preparing his case, and the
avoidance of sharp practices-are only slightly applicable in cases such
as Banks, evidence that the requested materials were prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation should be scrutinized carefully.
31. A third requisite not discussed here is that the evaluative or
investigative process serve a strong public interest which outweighs the
discovering party's need for the materials. The strength of the public
interest in improved hospital care and equal employment opportunity
compliance is apparent.
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note, however, that both courts allowed discovery of factual
data contained in the reports, suggesting an important limita-
tion to the protection.32
3. Methods of Protecting Confidential Documents
Although there are a number of possible methods of pro-
tecting self-evaluative materials, no one method is clearly ap-
propriate. Initially, there are several reasons the protection
granted such materials should not be labeled a privilege. First,
the problem surrounding self-evaluative reports has arisen al-
most exclusively in the discovery context. Thus, stating the
protection in terms of a privilege may cause confusion because
privileges apply equally at both trial and discovery. Second,
the policies supporting restriction of discovery are not always
congruent with those supporting the recognition of a privilege at
trial. Finally, the difficulty is compounded by the recent pro-
mulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence which unequivo-
cally limit the privileges that may be asserted and do not in-
clude a privilege for confidential self-evaluations. It seems un-
likely that the "privilege" relied on to provide protection in
Banks and Gilman can continue to be labeled a privilege after
the new rules take effect.33
Although both courts suggested that the protection might have been
overcome by a showing of exceptional necessity by the plaintiff, neither
opinion indicated what would constitute a sufficient showing. Two
possibilities are: 1) the court will allow more extensive discovery only
if the plaintiff can show he could not otherwise prove his case and
2) the necessity required to be shown might vary with the extent of the
public interest in self-evaluation and the degree to which the specific
disclosure requested will compromise that interest. Compare the stand-
ard in Rule 26 (b) (3) for the discovery of work product, supra note 30.
It should be noted that even if discovery of work product is or-
dered, Rule 26 (b) (3) requires that the court protect mental impressions,
conclusions, and opinions. Thus, essentially the same distinction be-
tween factual and nonfactual matter drawn by the courts in the instant
cases is applied when discovery of work product is ordered.
32. The Bank.s court ordered the defendant "to provide the plain-
tiffs ... with any factual or statistical information that was available
to the members of Lockheed's research 'team' at the time they con-
ducted their study." 53 F.R.D. at 285.
33. "[I]t should be clear that the term 'not privileged,' as used in
Rule [26], refers to 'privileged' as that term is understood in the law of
evidence." United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953). See also C.
WRiGT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 81 (2d ed. 1970). Rule 43(a), presently the
source of the laws of evidence for the federal courts, permits admission
of all evidence admissible under the statutes of the U.S., under the
rules of evidence formerly applied in 'equity suits in federal courts, or
under the court rules of the state in which the federal court sits. Under
this rule, federal courts have generally recognized state-created eviden-
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Another possible method of protecting self-evaluative ma-
terials involves the requirement of Rule 26(b)(1) that the ma-
terial sought be "relevant to the subject matter" of the action.
A court could conceivably rely on the public policy of fostering
compliance with regulatory laws and increased safety in deter-
mining whether certain materials are relevant under the Rule.
However, if public policy considerations are to enter into the
determination of the scope of discovery, they should be sepa-
rately articulated so as not to distort the meaning of relevancy.5 '
Finally, discovery might also be limited by using Rule 26(c),
as in Ballard v. Terrak,35 to order that discovery either be lim-
ited to facts and factual statements or that it not be had. As
noted earlier, it is questionable whether Rule 26 (c), as presently
drawn, permits the issuance of protective orders on public policy
grounds. Nonetheless, the use of a protective order under an
articulated standard would avoid many of the problems asso-
ciated with the use of the privilege and relevancy concepts.
4. The Rationale for Protection
The Banks and Gillman courts reasoned that, if discovery
were allowed, organizations in the future might be unwilling to
evaluate themselves or, even if willing, might be less likely or
able to do an adequate job. Several circumstances suggest
that discovery orders in cases such as Banks and Gillman would
not necessarily greatly deter future self-evaluations or substan-
tially reduce their thoroughness. First, evaluations will occur
in many cases even if the threat of discovery is present. For ex-
ample, the self-evaluation in the instant cases was not entirely
voluntary. The Banks defendant, as a contractor with the fed-
eral government, was required to engage in an evaluation pro-
tiary privileges as well as privileges created by federal law. However,
the new Federal Rules of Evidence provide only a limited number of
privileges. Once these rules become effective, state-created privileges
will be recognized only in certain designated situations. Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971). The Rules were
promulgated by the Supreme Court on November 20, 1972, and are
scheduled to take effect on July 1, 1973. The rules restrict the number
and scope of evidentiary privileges to be recognized by the federal
courts and provide for recognition of state law privileges only in cir-
cumscribed situations. 41 U.S.L.W. 4021 (U.S. Nov. 20, 1972).
34. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 81 (2d ed. 1970).
35. 16 FED. RULES SERv. 2d 26c.21, at 301 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See text
accompanying note 17 supra.
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gram.36 And, although the hospital director in Gillman was not
formally required to hold an investigation,3 7 pressure for a re-
view proceeding was probably brought to bear by the director's
staff and superiors and possibly by the public. Second, in some
cases there may be significant deterrents to candid self-evalua-
tion even absent the possibility of discovery. Administrative
sanctions against employees are often a possibility when self-
evaluative investigations are undertaken.38 Particularly in the
case of a hospital investigation, it is doubtful that the chilling
effect caused by possible disciplinary action would be greatly
compounded by the additional possibility of testimony being dis-
coverable in a subsequent civil action. An employee's interest
in protecting himself and his fellow employees from discipline is
likely to be at least as great as his interest in protecting his em-
ployer from suit. Thus, the additional deterrence of investiga-
tion occasioned by the possibility of discovery may be minute.
The above limitations do not, however, significantly detract
from the courts' reasoning. A lack of confidentiality almost in-
evitably will result in some cramping of the investigative proc-
ess, simply because the incentives for any institution to engage
in self-evaluative investigation pale considerably with the knowl-
edge that the results may be used against it. The company
might initially decide not to investigate or, if an investigation
is held, there might at least be an unconscious effort to tailor
the findings with an eye towards eventual litigation. In addi-
tion, even if the hospital administration in Gillman continued
to encourage thorough investigation of patient care, it would be
less able to ensure candid testimony and deliberations on the
part of the staff and the investigatory board.
Further, there are two more broadly-based notions that
might justify protecting materials from discovery in these situ-
ations. First, it may simply seem unfair to allow a party's care-
ful self-assessment to be used against him. The opposing party
should perhaps be made to prove his case without relying on a
36. See notes 6-7 supra.
37. 53 F.R.D. at 318.
38. Cf. Ballard v. Terrak, 16 FED. RULES SEav. 2d 26c.21, at 301(E.D. Wis. 1972) (see text accompanying note 17 supra) and Wood v.
Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7 (E.D. Wis. 1972), in which personnel investigations,
the files of which were sought by the plaintiffs, were called to determine
if disciplinary action would be taken against the police officers in-
volved. It is likely that the threat of discipline against a fellow officer
would chill this type of investigation at least as much as the more re-
mote possibility of discovery in future litigation.
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self-evaluation undertaken by his adversary for a laudatory ob-
jective. This argument is compelling when the opposing party
can in fact obtain comparable information through his own ef-
forts. However, where it is apparent that the opposing party
would be unable to obtain the approximate equivalent of the
materials independently, the argument loses force. Several fac-
tors indicate this may often be the case: witnesses might not
be as candid in an independent investigation, it will often be
physically impossible to repeat the investigation, and the facts
might not be as fresh.
Second, disclosure of self-assessments may be an unwar-
ranted invasion of an individual's privacy. In several cases, pro-
tection of privacy has been an independent basis for a denial of
discovery. In Williams v. Thomas Jefferson University,"0 for ex-
ample, the defendant was not required to produce the names of
women who had received abortions at its hospital.40 Although
in Williams the privacy interest was not that of the party de-
fendant, it would seem that the holding should also apply to
protection of a party's privacy. However, where a hospital or
business is concerned, it is questionable whether the privacy
consideration should be given the same weight as when the in-
terest is that of an individual.
5. Relationship of Protection at Discovery to Protection at Trial
The standards for admitting information into evidence are in
general more stringent than those for discovery; Rule 26(b) spe-
cifically provides that it is not a ground for objection that the
testimony sought will be inadmissible at trial if it appears rea-
sonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Therefore, the
restrictions on the number and scope of privileges contained in
the new Federal Rules of Evidence should make courts reluctant
to expand the areas protected from disclosure at the discovery
stage beyond that permitted in the Rules of Evidence." It
would be a violation of the policy and scheme of both the dis-
covery and the evidence rules to limit discovery in instances
39. 16 FED. RULES SEav. 2d 26b.45, at 444 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
40. See also Peterson v. United States, 52 F.R.D. 317 (S.D. Ill.
1971), in which the court rejected the government's argument that dis-
covery of reports by an Internal Revenue Service appellate conferee
would deter full and candid evaluation by employees, but indicated
that the public policy in favor of confidentiality would protect non-
party tax returns from discovery absent a strong showing of need.
Cf. Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1970).
41. See note 33 supra.
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where the requested material would be admissible at trial. On
the other hand, if material is inadmissible, some of the same poli-
cies which support its exclusion at trial may also support denial
of discovery.
The materials in Banks and Gillman would probably be ad-
missible under the federal evidence rules as within the business
records or admissions exceptions to the hearsay rule.42 If such
self-evaluative reports are in fact admissible, they should be
discoverable under the more liberal discovery procedures.
However, an argument for finding materials such as those
in the instant cases inadmissible may be based on Federal Rule
of Evidence 407, which prohibits admitting evidence of "meas-
ures. . . which, if taken previously, would have made the event
less likely to occur" in order to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct;4 3 in connection with an earlier event. The exclusion "rests
on a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not
discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added
safety. '44 Since the materials sought in Banks and Gillman were
not evidence of remedial measures, technically the rule does not
apply. But if evidence of remedial measures is inadmissible,
the deliberations, recommendations, opinions and conclusions
leading up to the measures must also be inadmissible to give the
exclusion its proper effect. For example, if the defendant hos-
pital in Gillman instituted new security procedures as a result
of the board's investigation, evidence of the new procedures
would not be admissible to prove prior negligence. This protec-
tion would be of little use to the defendant, however, if the dis-
42. Hearsay is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 802.
Rule 801(d), however, provides that a statement is not hearsay and
may be offered against a party if it is made by a person authorized by
him to make a statement about the subject or by his agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment,
during the existence of the relationship. It is likely that the reports of
the affirmative action "team" in Banks and of the board and director in
Gillman would fall within this exception.
If the documents are not deemed admissions, they nevertheless
might be admissible as "records of regularly conducted activity" under
Rule 803 (6). The rule specifically includes diagnoses and opinions as
well as acts, events and conditions, but its application here would be
questionable.
43. The evidence of such measures may be admitted on issues in
the action other than negligence or culpable conduct.
44. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 33, at
352. The subsequent remedial features exclusion was formerly based
on lack of relevancy, but the Advisory Committee Note indicates that
under a liberal theory of relevancy this ground alone would not support
exclusion.
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cussions and reports leading up to the decision to institute new
measures could be admitted.
This argument for inadmissibility does not necessarily con-
trol the issue of discovery of such materials since the scope of
discovery is broader than admissibility at trial. Nevertheless, at
least one court has reasoned by analogy that the conclusions and
recommendations of a Coast Guard investigator's report were
non-discoverable. In Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States,4 6
the court stated:
Denial of disclosure here is supported by the analogy of evi-
dence concerning remedial measures taken after an accident,
which would not be admissible even under the liberalized pro-
visions of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence .... A
Coast Guard investigator might feel less free to suggest "appro-
priate measures for promoting safety . . ." if he thought that
any suggestion of additional precautions might result in im-
posing pecuniary liability on the government.46
If the Reliable holding is followed, it will bolster the Banks-
Giliman rationale and closely tie discovery limitations to restric-
tions on the admission of evidence.
This linkage of discovery protection to inadmissibility at
trial has not escaped criticism. In Lindberger v. General Mo-
tors Corp.,4 7 a Wisconsin federal district court ordered defend-
ant to answer interrogatories regarding changes made in the
braking system of a front end loader after an accident, even
though evidence of such changes would have been inadmissible
at trial under the subsequent remedial measures rule. The court
based its refusal to derive a privilege at discovery from the sub-
sequent remedial measures exclusion at trial on the differences
45. 15 FED. RULES SERv. 2d 26b.43, at 189 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
46. Id. at 190. The court also relied on FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4),
which limits discovery of expert opinions, stating that "[tihe opinions
of an investigating officer are like expert opinions." Id. This may be
a misreading of the Rule since, even assuming that the investigator was
an expert within the meaning of 26 (b) (4), the Rule only applies to "facts
known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable . .. and
acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial." The
Reliable court quotes the language of a Coast Guard regulation, 46
C.F.R. § 136.07-1(b) (1972), to the effect that Coast Guard investiga-
tions are for the purpose of taking "appropriate measures for promoting
safety of life and property at sea," and are not intended to fix civil or
criminal liability, suggesting that the purpose of the investigation,
and hence the "expert's" opinion, was not preparation for trial. The
Reliable court probably used Rule 26(b) (4) and the analogy to the sub-
sequent remedial measures rule, rather than relying on executive privi-
lege, because of the imminent acceptance of the new evidence rules,
which the court knew would abrogate that privilege.
47. 56 F.R.D. 433 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
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in the policies underlying restrictions at discovery and at trial
and on a finding that no prejudice would result from discovery
of the remedial measures:
Stringent protection is afforded to the traditional privileges be-
cause disclosure, in itself, even outside the trial of the case,
may cause harm to the parties.... [I]n the instant case...[i]t is disclosure at trial, where a jury may improperly draw an
inference of negligence, which presents the danger to the de-
fendants, and consequently to the public. 48
It is clear from Lindberger that the reasons which dictate pro-
tection at trial are not always congruent with the reasons favor-
ing protection from discovery. A number of privileges do re-
quire total non-disclosure in order to prevent harm. For instance,
the attorney-client privilege is necessary at both the discovery
and trial stages in order to promote full client disclosure to the
attorney. However, it is often the case that substantial harm
can come to the party opposing disclosure only if the material is
used against him at trial, as was true of the remedial measures in
Lindberger.
The courts in Banks, Gillman, and Reliable were attempting
to avoid discouraging future self-investigations by not allowing
their results to prejudice the defendant. A partial accommoda-
tion between the rights of the discovering party to obtain infor-
mation and the policy protecting the confidentiality of certain
self-evaluative reports might have been reached in those cases
by allowing full discovery but prohibiting use of the materials at
trial, even for impeachment purposes. If it had been feared that
the party seeking discovery intended to make the material public
or use it for a purpose other than litigation, a suitable Rule
26(c) protective order could have been issued prohibiting gen-
eral disclosure of the information. The objections noted earlier
to issuance of Rule 26(c) orders on public policy grounds would
not have full effect here, since the order would be based at least
in part on the need to protect a person from embarrassment or
oppression. Of course, such a protective order could not en-
tirely eliminate the potential deterrent effect discovery might
have upon future self-evaluations, since whenever discovery is
of use to a party, the opposing party has given up an advantage,
the loss of which will to some degree deter future preparation
of reports.
6. Conclusion
In the future litigants will probably attempt to broaden the
48. Id. at 435.
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scope of the Banks and Gillman holdings to include other types
of confidential documents. For example, corporations may at-
tempt to avoid discovery of internal evaluations of worker and
plant efficiency, arguing an analogous public policy approach
based on the public interest of improving production.'49 Whether
the "privilege" recognized in Banks and Gillman has been fully
developed or will instead expand to encompass more than the
few peculiar fact situations to which it has heretofore been ap-
plied cannot yet be determined. Courts may be reluctant to ex-
pand the protection granted in the Banks and Gillman cases be-
yond its present narrow limits, since it represents an exception
to the policy of broad discovery and may undercut some of the
policies of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
If, despite the above considerations, courts are receptive to
efforts to broaden the Banks-Gillman protection, criteria for
granting protection on grounds of public policy should perhaps
be added to Rule 26(c). A redrawn rule might incorporate a bal-
ancing test, requiring the court to weigh the public interest in
non-disclosure against the equally pressing interest in conducting
litigation on all the available facts.
The strength of the public interest in non-disclosure depends
on both the importance to the public of the evaluative process
which is sought to be protected and the extent to which dis-
closure would impair that process. To determine the negative
effect that disclosure would have, a court would have to con-
sider 1) the magnitude and nature of the requested intrusion;
2) whether there are sufficient independent incentives to under-
take self-evaluation even when confidentiality cannot be assured;
and 3) the prejudicial effect disclosure would be likely to have
on the outcome of the case.
The liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are based in part on the premise that litigation is
best conducted when both parties have access to all available
facts. Therefore, the need the party seeking discovery has for
the materials is an important consideration. If the facts con-
49. A district court in the Northern District of Georgia, the dis-
trict where Banks originated, has indicated that the Banks decision
will not be used to give corporate documents blanket protection. After
citing Banks, the court in Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Transamer-
ica Ins. Co., No. 115112 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 1972) stated:
The public policy to encourage frank self-criticism and evalua-
tion which was held to protect from discovery certain Equal
Employment Survey Team Reports does not apply to documents
prepared in the normal course of the defendant's business of
investigating claims of its policy-holders.
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tamined in the reports are not available elsewhere, or if the party
seeking discovery does not have the resources to conduct an in-
dependent investigation, the interest involved is substantial,
since the true facts will not be available absent discovery.
If such a balancing approach is accepted, discovery should
be allowed, for example, of such documents as internal evalua-
tions of efficiency. The desire to increase profits ensures that
efficiency studies will be undertaken regardless of secrecy. The
opposing litigant would most likely be unable to obtain the
equivalent of the materials through his own efforts. In addition,
while the confidentiality of corporate documents relating to im-
portant public interests, such as fire protection, safety and
health, might legitimately be protected even in the face of a
strong showing of need by the party seeking discovery, docu-
ments related to less compelling interests, such as increased pro-
duction, probably should not be protected.
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